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I. INTRODUCTION
In a world where global economies are increasingly interdependent,
the United States, and its North American counterparts, Canada and
Mexico, are booming sources of international trade. Now, more than
ever, global competitiveness necessitates developments in U.S. infra-
structure, especially at major border crossings where congestion and
poor infrastructure create bottlenecks interfering with the free move-
ment of goods. Questions pertaining to international border crossings
circle the debate at the most crucial international border crossing in
North America: the Ambassador Bridge, which spans the Detroit
River between Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario. A legal bat-
* J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M School of Law.
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tle rages over the proposed construction of a new publicly owned
bridge that will compete with the eighty-six-year-old privately owned
bridge. Many questions surround this topic, including whether the
United States may allow the construction of a bridge that competes
with a private individual’s livelihood. Is there a compelling case for a
government taking in favor of public infrastructure? Should a private
individual be able to own a major international border crossing? Ad-
ditionally, in anticipation of construction of a new bridge, what will be
the implications for the community that must give up its property to
make way for the construction?
This Comment will focus on the conflict over the construction of the
New International Trade Crossing (NITC), also known as the “Bridge
to the Future,” in competition with the Ambassador Bridge and its
relevance to the conversation of border infrastructure. It will further
demonstrate some of the pitfalls in the private ownership of an inter-
national border crossing—as well as some that inhere in government
ownership—arguing for a new infrastructure model that promotes col-
laboration between the public and private sectors. Ultimately, this Ar-
ticle will argue that, like the NITC, future border infrastructure
projects should be developed through the use of public-private part-
nerships (hereinafter “P3s”) to promote North American trade
development.
II. THE LEGAL BATTLE AT THE AMBASSADOR BRIDGE
Plans to construct the New International Trade Crossing, recently
coined the “Gordie Howe International Crossing,” a new bridge span-
ning the Detroit River between Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, On-
tario, by way of a P3 are well underway.1 However, Matthew “Matty”
Moroun, private owner of the Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit
International Bridge Company (DIBC) and Canadian Transit Com-
pany, has vehemently opposed construction of the NITC Bridge. The
conflict between the Ambassador Bridge and the NITC presents
timely issues for developing infrastructure projects at international
border crossings. One key consideration is the impact of allowing the
private sector to own and operate international border crossings. If
private ownership of international border crossings is an unsound
model, can the government compete with, and ultimately divert, “cus-
tomers” from this privately owned business?2 These are the questions
1. Crossing Agreement, Can.-Mich., June 15, 2012, https://www.michigan.gov/
documents/buildthisbridge/Agreement_389284_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SCV-9PJW]
(establishing a P3 between Canada, a Canadian Crossing Authority, and Michigan).
2. This is an interesting question not raised by the case, though an analogous
1848 Supreme Court decision seems to suggest that this type of taking would be per-
missible under the public-use requirement of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848) (holding that a bridge
owned by a private company under a charter from the state may be condemned and
taken as part of a public road under the laws of that state).
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that surround Moroun’s battle to protect his bridge company. Indica-
tions from the courts seem to signify that the government of Michigan
will be permitted to construct a new bridge in direct competition with
the privately owned Ambassador Bridge.3 However, DIBC is not the
only entity seeking compensation, as the residents whose neighbor-
hood will be condemned to make way for the NITC may be entitled to
compensation from the government for their loss.4 However, despite
the looming legal battle, in the absence of competition considerations,
the NITC presents an excellent example of how future infrastructure
projects at international border crossings can be realized.
A. History of the Ambassador Bridge
In 1909, Canada, by the authority of the United Kingdom, signed
and ratified a treaty with the United States to govern the construction
of new bridges over the boundary waters between the two countries.5
The treaty authorized legislation otherwise known as “special agree-
ments” for the construction of new bridges, specifying that concurrent
legislation by the United States Congress and Canada would consti-
tute a “special agreement.”6 In 1920, the American Transit Company
was formed to construct a bridge between Detroit, Michigan, and On-
tario, Canada.7 The company was formed because, at the time, Michi-
gan automakers sought to connect Canada and the Midwest, but
neither Detroit nor Ontario would provide funding for the project.8 In
1921, both the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament
passed separate legislation granting the American Transit Company
the rights to construct, operate, and collect tolls on the proposed
bridge.9 The U.S. statute (commonly referred to as the Detroit Inter-
national Bridge Company (DIBC) Act) granted congressional consent
for construction of the bridge to the American Transit Company and
3. See Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C.
2015) (order dismissing all but one of DIBC’s claims against the governments of the
United States and Canada), amended on denial of reconsideration, 189 F. Supp. 3d 85
(D.D.C. 2016).
4. H. Adam Cohen & Jason C. Long, Bridging the Gap: Just Compensation for
Condemnees’ Business Damages and the New International Trade Crossing, 42 MICH.
REAL PROP. REV. 3, 3 (2015).
5. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 77; see also Treaty Between the
United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United
States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, 2449–50 [hereinafter
Boundary Waters Treaty] (declaring that any new uses, obstructions, or diversions of
boundary waters require approval by an international Joint Commission).
6. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 77–78.
7. Id. at 78.
8. Luiza Ch. Savage, Land of the Freeloaders: The Battle for a New Cross-Border
Bridge, MACLEAN’S (May 21, 2015), http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/land-of-the-
freeloaders-the-battle-for-a-new-cross-border-bridge/ [https://perma.cc/PL33-DDAF]
(citing PHILIP P. MASON, THE AMBASSADOR BRIDGE: A MONUMENT TO PROGRESS
48, 52 (Wayne State University Press, Great Lakes Books ed. 1987)).
9. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 78.
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its successors, designating that the bridge be constructed “within or
near the city limits of Detroit.”10 After the failure of the American
Transit Company, supporters of the bridge sought the expertise of
New York businessman Joseph A. Bower. Bower raised the twelve
million dollars needed to fund the project, and in 1927 the American
Transit Company transferred its rights and assets to DIBC.11 That
same year, the United States Department of State sent a letter to
DIBC stating that the DIBC Act was a “special agreement” under the
Boundary Waters Treaty; thus, the bridge would not require approval
of the International Joint Commission.12 However, construction of the
bridge was met with opposition as the mayor of Detroit, John Smith,
sued to halt construction out of concern that a crucial piece of infra-
structure would be privately owned.13 Despite the mayor’s opposition,
the city of Detroit voted to allow the bridge to be owned and funded
by a private company.14
After two years of construction, the bridge opened for traffic on
November 11, 1929.15 Under the financial burden of the Great De-
pression, tolls did not cover the costs of operating the bridge, and in
1939 DIBC was listed on the New York Stock Exchange as a public
company.16 DIBC continued as a publicly traded company until 1979
when Matthew Moroun’s family bought out the company’s sharehold-
ers (including noteworthy investor Warren Buffet) and privatized the
company.17 In 1995 the Ambassador Bridge became part of the na-
tional highway system.18 Since then, DIBC has benefited from $230
million in congressional authorizations for highway expansion projects
linking the bridge to the Interstate Highway and State Highway Sys-
tems in Michigan.19 As of 2014, Mr. Moroun had amassed a $1.7 bil-
lion fortune, and Forbes Magazine listed him as the 373rd wealthiest
person in America.20 The Ambassador Bridge is arguably the most
important international border crossing in the United States. Accord-
ing to a 2002 Federal Highway Administration Report, it is the single
busiest international land border crossing in North America and ac-
10. Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 4, 1921, ch. 167, Pub. L. No. 66-39566th, § 1, 41 Stat.
1439 (1921)).
11. Id. at 79; Savage, supra note 8. R
12. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 79.
13. Savage, supra note 8. R
14. Id.
15. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 78.
16. Savage, supra note 8. R
17. Id.
18. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 79.
19. Savage, supra note 8. R
20. Id.
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commodates twenty-seven percent of the nearly $400 billion in annual
trade between Canada and the U.S.21
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed a major weak-
ness in the Ambassador Bridge. After the attacks, the international
border was closed, and thousands of trucks were stuck along the roads
on the Canadian side.22 “It was a stark demonstration of how crippling
it would be if there were a long-term problem with the [eighty-six-
year-old] Ambassador Bridge—especially in an era of ‘just-in-time’
inventory systems.”23 After these events, groups began to develop
plans for an alternative bridge that would be more conducive to the
modern mass movement of goods between the United States and Ca-
nada.24 Planners conducted exhaustive studies to determine the
growth of traffic demands at the Detroit-Windsor corridor, concluding
that a new bridge was necessary to accommodate cross-border vol-
ume.25 Eventually, planners chose a location only two miles downriver
from the Ambassador Bridge for the possible location of the new
bridge that would come to be known as the “New International Trade
Crossing” or “NITC.”26
This was the beginning of Moroun’s battle to continue the viability
of his immensely profitable business, as a new, competing bridge
would divert traffic—and ultimately money—away from the Ambas-
sador Bridge.27 To confront the plan to build a new bridge, DIBC de-
veloped a plan of its own: it would build a “twin span” next to the
existing bridge, adding six more lanes.28 However, proponents of the
NITC bridge cited issues that the Ambassador Bridge caused in down-
town Windsor, as truckers are required to stop at eighteen traffic
lights in order to reach the bridge, creating problems for truckers and
city residents alike.29 Canada ultimately announced it would provide
all necessary capital for the NITC, which would be funded and oper-
ated through a P3 between private investors, Canada, and the State of
Michigan.30
21. Ambassador Bridge Crossing Summary, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT.
TRANSP., http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/freight_analysis/ambass_brdg/
ambass_brdge_ovrvw.htm [https://perma.cc/A887-8UVN].
22. Savage, supra note 8. R
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See MICH. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., DETROIT RIVER IN-
TERNATIONAL CROSSING PROJECT: DRAFT PURPOSE AND NEED 2 (June 2005), http://
www.partnershipborderstudy.com/pdf/Purpose_and_Need_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9XS9-2CVF].
26. Savage, supra note 8. R
27. Pl.’s 3d Am. Compl. at 5, Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 133 F.
Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 10-cv-476-RMC) (“Studies . . . estimate that up to
75% of the Ambassador Bridge’s truck traffic and up to 39% of its passenger traffic
will be diverted to the NITC/DRIC.”).
28. Id. at 3–4; Savage, supra note 8. R
29. Savage, supra note 8. R
30. Crossing Agreement, supra note 1 at 2–3. R
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In May 2010, the Michigan House of Representatives passed a bill
authorizing the creation of a P3 to build the bridge, but Republicans
who controlled the state senate feared Michigan taxpayers would end
up footing the bill.31 As Michigan prepared for the November 2010
elections, the Moroun family spent $1.5 million in political contribu-
tions to Michigan state and federal congressional candidates in an at-
tempt to halt construction of a competing bridge.32
A great deal of controversy surrounds Moroun’s private ownership
of the Ambassador Bridge. In 2010, the Wayne County Michigan Cir-
cuit Court granted the Michigan Department of Transportation partial
summary judgment in its breach of contract claim against DIBC for its
refusal to comply with an agreement for the “Gateway Project.”33
Under the terms of the agreement, DIBC was to connect the Ambas-
sador Bridge to Interstates 75 and 96 and complete other improve-
ments on the bridge.34 Subsequently, in 2012, the court held DIBC in
contempt and ordered Moroun and the company’s chief deputy to be
imprisoned for their failure to comply with court orders.35 Many have
alleged that the reason for Moroun’s non-compliance was his desire to
push traffic past his duty-free fuel pumps, the profits of which are
pocketed by DIBC and Moroun.36 This controversy is mentioned to
highlight the concerns expressed by many about DIBC’s private own-
ership, as oversight of compliance with necessary expansion
projects—in the case of a government-owned bridge—would typically
be governed by state authorities.
While DIBC does not hold a monopoly over the Detroit-Windsor
border crossing, there are currently no close substitutes to the bridge
for moving goods across the border.37 The majority of commercial
traffic passes over the Ambassador Bridge because commercial trucks
carrying oversized loads are not permitted to pass through the nearby
Detroit-Windsor Tunnel.38
31. Savage, supra note 8. R
32. Id.
33. Mich. Dep’t of Transp. v. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., No. 09-015581-CK, Opinion
and Order at 3 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct., Mar. 8, 2012).
34. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Mich. Dep’t of Transp., 298276, 2011 WL 6058037,
at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2011).
35. Brief of Appellees at 1–2, In re Moroun, 814 N.W.2d 319 (Mich. Ct. App.
2012) (No. 308053).
36. See Matt Helms & John Gallagher, Mich. Billionaire, 84, Jailed over Bridge
Dispute, USA TODAY (Jan. 12, 2012, 1:35 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/
nation/story/2012-01-12/michigan-canada-ambassador-bridge/52517112/1 [https://per
ma.cc/XK3L-FFBZ].
37. William P. Anderson, The Windsor-Detroit Crossing: Issues in P3s When Infra-
structure Crosses Borders 4 (Laurier Ctr. for Econ. Res. & Pol’y Analysis, Research
Paper 2010-05, June 2010), http://www.lcerpa.org/public/papers/APGCI_LCERPA
%202010-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/9549-5RBX].
38. See MICH. ST. POLICE TRAFFIC SAFETY DIV., BORDER CROSSING GUIDE FOR
COM. TRUCK DRIVERS 10 (2008), http://www.truckingsafety.org/Portals/0/Guide
Books/Border_Crossing_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2PF-94WD].
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B. Detroit International Bridge Company v. Government of Canada
A discussion of the case brought by Moroun against the govern-
ments of Canada and the United States serves multiple purposes.
First, it illustrates Moroun’s protracted legal battle to maintain control
of one of North America’s most vital and profitable border crossings.
Second, the issues raised by the case demonstrate the many legal theo-
ries on which a private entity may attempt to prevent the government
from interfering with its potential property interests; namely, how pri-
vate interests might be superseded by public interests. Third, the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of almost all of Moroun’s claims against the
government lends support to the arguments of NITC proponents in
what seems to be the general sentiment: that an increase in trade
through the pivotal Windsor-Detroit gateway necessitates construc-
tion of a new bridge that can accommodate increases in cross-border
traffic.39
1. Procedural History
Anticipating a massive threat to his profitable enterprise, Moroun
and DIBC filed suit in March 2010 in the Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia, naming as defendants the government of Ca-
nada, the United States of America, the United States Federal High-
way Administration, the United States Coast Guard, and the
Michigan Department of Transportation, among others.40 DIBC sued
for what it alleged were violations of its exclusive franchise right to
own and operate a bridge between Detroit and Windsor.41 In July
2010, DIBC filed a voluntary dismissal of the government of Canada,
believing that the Michigan legislature had blocked construction of
the NITC.42 However, efforts to construct the NITC resumed as the
proposed crossing had received the necessary permits from the United
States government.43 DIBC filed a second amended complaint in Feb-
ruary 2013. Then, in May 2013, DIBC filed its Third Amended Com-
plaint against all previously named authorities, adding the United
States Department of State (and Secretary of State) and setting forth
nine counts against the Federal Defendants.44
39. See, e.g., History of the Detroit River International Crossing (DRIC)/New Inter-
national Trade Crossing (NITC) Project, WINDSOR DET. BRIDGE AUTHORITY, https://
www.wdbridge.com/en/history [https://perma.cc/MA9R-DMUP].
40. Pl.’s Compl. at 4, Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d
70 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:10-cv-00476-RMC).
41. Id. at 1–2.
42. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 53 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C.
2014).
43. Presidential Permit Authorizing Michigan to Construct, Connect, Operate,
and Maintain a Bridge Linking Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario, 78 Fed. Reg.
25521 (May 1, 2013).
44. Third Amended Complaint, Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, No.
1:10-cv-00476-RMC (D.D.C., filed May 29, 2013).
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On May 30, 2014, a district judge for the District of Columbia issued
an opinion on DIBC’s fourth count, dismissing DIBC’s allegations
that the United States Coast Guard was arbitrary and capricious in
failing to issue a navigational permit for DIBC’s plan to add a twin
span to the bridge,45 a decision that was appealed and dismissed as
moot because the Coast Guard later issued the permit.46 The district
court then issued a second opinion on September 30, 2015, dismissing
all but one of the eight remaining counts alleged by DIBC.47
2. Relevant Facts
In the International Bridge Act of 1972 (IBA), Congress for the
first time granted consent for the “construction, maintenance, and op-
eration of international bridges” without requiring congressional legis-
lation.48 The IBA has several requirements for construction of an
international bridge including: foreign country consent, compliance
with the 1906 Bridge Act, and a set of Executive Branch approvals as
specified below:
[For] a State . . . to enter into agreements (1) with the Government
of Canada, a Canadian Province, or a subdivision or instrumentality
of either, in the case of a bridge connecting the United States and
Canada . . . for the construction, operation, and maintenance of
such bridge in accordance with the applicable provisions of this sub-
chapter. The effectiveness of such agreement shall be conditioned
on its approval by the Secretary of State.49
The IBA also requires presidential approval, stating that the Presi-
dent shall “secure the advice and recommendation of . . . the heads of
such departments and agencies of the Federal Government as he
deems appropriate to determine the necessity of such bridge.”50 DIBC
stated that it had been trying to obtain the necessary federal permits
to build an addition—the “New Span”—with the goal of updating fa-
cilities, reducing costly maintenance, and improving the efficiency of
traffic flow on either side of the border.51 Around the same time (late
2000) the Canadian Ministry of Transport, Infrastructure, and Com-
munities along with the Michigan Department of Transportation, the
45. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1.
46. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6187 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 4, 2016).
47. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 109 (D.D.C. 2015). In her opinion
on motion for rehearing Judge Collyer reaffirmed her previous dismissal of several of
DIBC’s counts. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 189 F. Supp. 3d 85, 110
(D.D.C. 2016).
48. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 79; see also International Bridge
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 535–535i (2012).
49. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 79–80 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 535(a)).
50. Id. at 80 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 535(b)).
51. Id.; see also State of Michigan’s New International Trade Crossing Presidential
Permit Application, U.S. DEP’T STATE (June 18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/docu
ments/organization/194997.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7K7-9HT8].
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provincial Ontario Ministry of Transportation, and the U.S. Federal
Highway Administration formed the Ontario-Michigan Border Trans-
portation Partnership, which ultimately became the Detroit River In-
ternational Crossing Partnership.52
3. Detroit International Bridge Company’s Relevant Complaints
Against Federal Defendants
a. Violation of the Foreign Compact Clause
DIBC’s first count alleged that the Crossing Agreement was invalid
because it violated the foreign compact clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which gives states the authority, with the consent of Congress, to
enter into agreements (compacts) with other states or foreign pow-
ers.53 DIBC alleged that the IBA was an unconstitutional delegation
of congressional power, requesting that the court declare the crossing
agreement to be void and unenforceable because it could not be ap-
proved by the Secretary of State and had not been approved by Con-
gress.54 However, the court agreed with the Federal Defendants and
confirmed that Congress may delegate power to the Executive Branch
so long as there is “an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”55
The court went on to note that the IBA conditions agreements with
Mexico or Canada on Department of State approval, otherwise, con-
gressional action (contrasted with a presidential permit) would be re-
quired for every proposed international bridge.56 Additionally, in
demonstrating that the delegation was, in fact, guided by an intelligi-
ble principle, the court pointed out that in passing the IBA, Congress
adopted the Department of State’s advice in order to insert the neces-
sary guidance into the Act.57 The court also pointed to the Supreme
Court’s statements giving deference to congressional policy decisions
in the context of foreign affairs, as it “must of necessity paint with a
brush broader than that it customarily wields in the domestic area.”58
Accordingly, the court dismissed DIBC’s claim of a violation of the
foreign compact clause because of Congress’ delegation of power in
the IBA.59
52. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 83.
53. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
54. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 85.
55. Id. at 86 (quoting TOMAC v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 866 (D.C. Cir.2006)).
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
58. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 87 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 17 (1965)).
59. Id.
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b. Declaratory Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Franchise Rights
DIBC also alleged that it had an “exclusive statutory and contrac-
tual franchise right . . . to construct, maintain, and operate an interna-
tional bridge between Detroit and Windsor,” including a franchise
right to construct the New Span.60 Ultimately, the court decided that
DIBC did have a private right of action, but that DIBC had no exclu-
sive franchise right. The court noted that there is a presumption that
the “law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights
but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall
ordain otherwise.”61 The IBA did not indicate that Congress intended
to enter into a contract with DIBC, thus requiring mutuality of obliga-
tion.62 Accordingly, the right to repeal the legislation was expressly
reserved to Congress.
The more pressing question as to franchise rights was whether Con-
gress created a private right of action in DIBC itself; since the DIBC
Act was silent as to this right, the only way it could exist was by impli-
cation.63 The court further noted that DIBC was granted a time-con-
strained right to build a bridge, but that right was not a requirement
that DIBC actually build or operate the bridge.64
The court also clarified that exclusive rights to franchises are not
favored, and in the rare event that they are granted, “they will be
protected, but they will never be presumed.”65 In holding that DIBC’s
franchise rights were not exclusive, the court emphasized that the fed-
eral government has a legitimate interest in promoting trade and
travel between the United States and Canada and that “[a]ny limita-
tion on Congress’s power to authorize construction of another bridge
. . . must be evident in the DIBC Act by an express grant of exclusiv-
ity.”66 In dismissing DIBC’s second count, the court reasoned that
though the competing NITC could potentially diminish profitability of
the Ambassador Bridge, that argument was not enough to support
DIBC’s franchise claims.67
Count three was also dismissed and the court found that with no
grant of exclusive franchise right, DIBC’s allegations of a contractual
right to build a new span was “reduced to a complaint about unfair
increased competition and reduced profit margins.”68 Consequently,
the construction of the competing NITC could not be a violation of
60. Id.
61. Id. at 89 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 90.
64. Id. at 92.
65. Id. (quoting Wright v. Nagle, 101 U.S. 791, 796 (1879) (holding that the gov-
ernment should never be presumed to have surrendered its power)).
66. Id. at 94.
67. Id. at 95.
68. Id.
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DIBC’s right to build a new span, even if the economic purpose for
doing so was threatened.69
c. Declaratory Judgment as to Uncompensated Taking of Private
Property
DIBC sought a declaratory judgment that the government’s actions
were a taking of private property rights without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment; but the fatal flaw of this argument
was that DIBC did not seek any form of monetary relief.70 Therefore,
according to the Tucker Act, only equitable (and not monetary) relief
could be provided to DIBC; thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the claim.71 DIBC argued that the taking was unconstitutional be-
cause the government was, in essence, transferring its private property
to a competing commercial venture that could be enjoined without
regard to whether compensation was provided.
DIBC emphasized the unconstitutionality of a taking for private
purposes as “it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not
take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to an-
other private party, B, even though A is paid just compensation.”72
The court agreed but clarified that a state may transfer property from
one private party to another if future use by the public is the purpose
of the taking, reasoning that the NITC will be a bridge accessible to
the general public, owned and operated by sovereigns and not private
entities.73
The fact that the NITC/DRIC, if completed, will be a competitor for
traffic that previously crossed the Ambassador Bridge does not turn
the current sovereign actions of U.S. government entities into pri-
vate commercial ventures. Because the alleged taking is not per se
unconstitutional, i.e., one for private purposes, [DIBC] must seek a
Tucker Act remedy in the Court of Federal Claims.74
Accordingly, the court stated DIBC would have to allege a noncom-
pensable taking with no assurance of adequate compensation in the
event of a future taking.75 Therefore, because DIBC could present a
Tucker Act claim in the Court of Federal Claims, it could not sue for
equitable relief in federal district court and its claim was dismissed.76
69. Id.
70. Id. at 95–96.
71. Id. at 95–98 (citing Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)).




76. Id. at 98.
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d. Administrative Procedure Act Claims Based on Issuance of
Presidential Permit
In its sixth count, DIBC argued that the “State Department’s deci-
sion to grant a Presidential Permit . . . was contrary to law, arbitrary
and capricious, and in excess of statutory authority . . . .”77 The Fed-
eral Defendants responded by asserting that DIBC lacked Article III
standing according to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lujan and
Sebelius.78
DIBC had no difficulty supporting the allegations in its complaint
that construction of a competing bridge would cause an immediate
economic injury as a result of lost traffic and toll revenues, citing stud-
ies of U.S. and Canadian supporters of the NITC estimating that up to
seventy-five percent of the Ambassador Bridge’s truck traffic and
thirty-nine percent of its passenger traffic would be diverted by a com-
peting bridge.79 Despite the federal defendant’s arguments to the con-
trary, the court granted standing as to DIBC’s sixth and seventh
counts.80
The Federal Defendants argued that the permit for the NITC/DIBC
was an unreviewable presidential action, further reasoning that the
Department of State had power to issue the permit under Executive
Order 11423 through the President’s inherent constitutional power to
regulate foreign powers.81 Ultimately, the court concluded that the is-
suance of a permit was a presidential action not reviewable under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).82 Though the APA is silent as
to the President’s status as an “agency” under the Act, the court was
quick to note that “textual silence is not enough to subject the Presi-
dent to the provisions of the APA,” and an express authorization by
Congress is needed before assuming the President’s performance of
duties would be reviewable.83 Therefore, presidential discretionary
acts are not reviewable under the APA.84
77. Id.
78. Id. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (reciting
the standing requirements that a plaintiff establish (1) an actual ‘injury in fact’ oc-
curred; (2) the injury is traceable to the actions of the defendant; and (3) a favorable
decision is likely to redress the injury); Coal. for Mercury-Free Drugs v. Sebelius, 671
F.3d 1275, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (requiring that the future injury to a party be immi-
nent and the plaintiff demonstrate a “personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.”).
79. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 99.
80. Id. at 100.
81. Id. at 101.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 78, 800–01 (1992)).
84. Id.
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The President maintains authority to approve bridges through Ex-
ecutive Order 11423.85 In the same vein, DIBC maintained that the
President’s authority to approve bridges derived not from inherent
constitutional authority, but rather from a grant of authority by Con-
gress and the IBA.86 However, as the court noted, the IBA requires
presidential approval and not presidential permits, as only Executive
Order 11423 sets procedures for permits.87 Naturally, the President
maintains inherent constitutional authority over foreign relations and
can thus delegate authority to other agencies; in such a manner the
President delegated authority to the Department of State to issue
cross-border permits.88 The necessary converse of this delegation of
power by the President is that he also retains the power to modify,
amend, suspend, or revoke any permit issued under his authority.89
Effectively, such review of presidential acts, argued the court, would
violate the separation-of-powers principle and require the President
to personally decide each international bridge permit.90 For these rea-
sons, the court denied DIBC’s sixth count.91 DIBC’s seventh count—
alleging that the United States Department of State’s approval of the
Crossing Agreement was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre-
tion—was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment.92 The court has
85. Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 11,423, 33 Fed. Reg. 11741 (Aug. 16, 1968)) (re-
quiring the consultation of the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attor-
ney General, and Secretary of Transportation).
86. Id. at 101–02.
87. Id. at 102.
88. Id.; see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d
105, 109 (D.D.C. 2009).
89. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d at 103.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court also denied counts eight and nine of DIBC’s third amended com-
plaint. Count eight, requesting judicial review of ultra vires and unlawful action, was
dismissed because DIBC could not clearly cite an instance where the Federal Defend-
ants acted in excess of statutory powers or prohibitions. Id. at 107. In count nine,
DIBC alleged equal protection claims based on disparate treatment, but the court
determined that DIBC and proponents of the NITC/DRIC were not similarly situ-
ated, reasoning, “[t]he fact that two independent federal agencies have granted or
denied entirely distinct regulatory approvals at a similar point in time does not estab-
lish a viable equal protection claim.” Id. at 107–08.
92. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 192 F. Supp. 3d 54, 81 (D.D.C.
2016). In its seventh count, DIBC maintained that USDS acted in violation of the
APA in its approval of the crossing agreement because the agreement has no basis in
Michigan law. Third Amended Complaint at 107, Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of
Canada, No. 1:10-cv-00476-RMC (D.D.C., filed May 29, 2013). However, in their De-
cember 2015 motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s-count seven, the Federal
Defendants argued the legality of the crossing agreement under Michigan law, point-
ing to express confirmations by the Governor of Michigan and the Michigan Attorney
General’s Office. Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Seven of Plaintiffs’ Third
Amended Complaint and Memorandum in Support at 2, Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v.
Gov’t of Canada, No. 1:10-cv-00476-RMC (D.D.C., filed Dec. 22, 2015); see also Brief
for Michigan Governor Richard D. Snyder as Amicus Curiae at 5, Detroit Int’l Bridge
Co., 133 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 10-cv-476-RMC).,
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since entered final judgment on all of DIBC’s claims.93
C. Implications of the NITC Bridge Construction and Other
Property Interests
Having received unfavorable rulings on all of DIBC’s complaints, it
appears, at least for now, that the construction of the NITC will move
forward despite Matthew Moroun’s tireless efforts to protect his prof-
itable interest in the Ambassador Bridge.94 However, the property in-
terests of another group affected by the planned construction of the
NITC remain at stake. While the NITC is a highly anticipated project
for many, it does not come without a cost. Concerns of eminent do-
main are a significant implication of the NITC construction and will
be equally significant in future border infrastructure projects modeled
after the NITC.
As the NITC construction advances, residents of Detroit’s Delray
neighborhood, through which the NITC is planned to run, will almost
certainly be expelled from their community to make way for the
bridge—a prospect that has many residents divided.95 The Delray
neighborhood—once a thriving immigrant community—has trans-
formed into a post-industrial dumping ground and the proverbial pa-
riah of Detroit, its population having dwindled from roughly 23,000 at
its peak in the mid-1800s, to only 2,000 in 2012.96 A community in
major decline, most Delray residents live below the poverty line.97
Construction of the NITC will necessitate the demolition of a large
portion of Delray, but in return the government of Michigan assures it
will offer compensation to residents and business owners through emi-
nent domain. While some residents anticipate generous compensation
for their properties, others remain wary of Michigan’s promises.98
Adam Cohen and Jason Long, two prominent Michigan attorneys
specializing in representing property owners in eminent domain mat-
ters, argue that the implications of the NITC may not be as promising
as some local business owners might hope when they seek “just com-
pensation.”99 Because the NITC will likely result in condemnation of
a substantial part of the neighborhood, many business owners will be
93. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, No. 1:10-cv-00476-RMC (D.D.C.,
filed Aug. 24, 2016) (order to enter final judgment).
94. John Gallagher, Bridge Chairman Vows Project Will Finish on Time, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Jan. 18, 2016, 3:07 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/
michigan/2016/01/16/windsor-detroit-bridge-duncan-trudeau/78793016/ [https://
perma.cc/3NRH-P523].
95. See Danielle Trauth-Jurman, The Story of Delray: A Case Study on Environ-
mental and Restorative Justice in Detroit 5 (Bowling Green St. U., Honors Projects
Paper 124, Spring 2014), http://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1121&contexthonorsprojects [https://perma.cc/6USC-PXXB].
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 7.
98. Id. at 9–10.
99. Cohen & Long, supra note 4, at 3–4. R
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unable to relocate because of cost. Cohen and Long argue that busi-
ness owners should be able to receive just compensation for loss of
going concern in addition to lost profits.100 According to Cohen and
Long, in the event of a taking by eminent domain, Michigan’s existing
legal standards “will fail to do justice as business owners who lose
profits due to takings will not be placed in the same positions they
would have occupied had their business properties not been taken in
the first place.”101
Many Delray residents anticipated these and other implications of
the NITC, filing suit to block its construction in 2010.102 Community
organizers joined forces with DIBC in the litigation to challenge the
Federal Highway Administration’s selection of the Delray neighbor-
hood as the location for the new customs plaza of the NITC.103 How-
ever, rather than citing issues of compensation, the litigants asserted
violations of the National Environmental Policy Act, an argument that
the Sixth Circuit ultimately rejected in affirming the district court’s
decision.104
In sum, Matthew Moroun’s legal battle against the U.S. government
demonstrates the conflict between the Ambassador Bridge and the
NITC as extremely relevant to the future of border infrastructure
projects. This is especially true given the importance of the Detroit-
Windsor corridor to North American trade. Moreover, the district
court’s opinion highlights the state of the law surrounding border in-
frastructure development, as well as the federal government’s over-
arching power to regulate it. These issues demonstrate, now more
than ever, the necessity for cooperation between the public and pri-
vate sectors in future border infrastructure projects.
III. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR FUTURE
INFRASTRUCTURE AT INTERNATIONAL BORDER
CROSSINGS
The many legal impediments that DIBC faced—and continues to
face—in its ownership of an international border crossing and its at-
tempts to stymie a competing bridge beg the question: Who should
own, operate, and fund international border crossings, and what is the
best model for such an undertaking? This Author contends that P3s,
the mechanism being used to develop the NITC, are a sound model
100. Id. at 6 (“going concern . . . which represents the intangible value of a business
and is not limited to hard assets, is available where a business is dependent on its
particular location and cannot be transferred”) (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Campbell,
438 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)).
101. Id. at 8.
102. Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ. Dev. v. Adm’r of Fed. Highway Admin., 858 F.
Supp. 2d 839 (E.D. Mich. 2012), aff’d,756 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2014).
103. Id. at 451.
104. Id. at 451–52, 466–77.
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for future border infrastructure projects, which become increasingly
necessary as the U.S. seeks to remain competitive in the international
trade market.
Especially important to U.S. competitiveness is the need for cross-
border trade promotion with Canada and Mexico. For example, ex-
perts at the Council on Foreign Relations underscore the necessity of
bolstering economic competitiveness through the unimpeded move-
ment of goods and services across borders.105 The need for the free
movement of goods in North America is evidenced by the intercon-
nectedness of manufacturers; that is, intra-regional transfers among
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico accounted for forty-eight percent of
North America’s total exports in 2012.106 Experts point to substantial
increases in North American regional integration as indicative of the
recent shift toward continent-wide production.107 They argue that up-
grades to border infrastructure are crucial to this process and empha-
size the ability to “compete in a dynamic and competitive world
economy . . . by [ ] enhanced economic ties with Canada and
Mexico.”108
At the forefront of the infrastructure improvement policy discussion
are P3s—an innovative strategy for leveraging private capital to fund
public infrastructure projects. P3s can initiate with government identi-
fication of a project and designation of a P3 as the means by which the
project will be designed, constructed, financed, and operated.109 Alter-
natively, they can be initiated through proposals from the private sec-
tor to government agencies for purposes of constructing a public
structure.110 Successful P3s are generally characterized by: “(1) the
sharing of complementary powers and expertise, and (2) the sharing
of risks and rewards.”111
From a microeconomics perspective on P3s for highway projects,
Joseph Kile describes “public-private partnerships” as “a variety of
alternative arrangements for [infrastructure] projects that transfer
more of the risk associated with and control of a project to a private
partner.”112 A more expansive definition includes “any contractual ar-
rangement [between a public sector entity and a private company]
105. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT
NO. 71: NORTH AMERICA 29, 67 (2014), (available at http://www.cfr.org/north-
america/north-america/p33536 [https://perma.cc/V5KL-G5RY]).
106. Id. at 31.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 29.
109. David Lick & Roger E. Hamlin, Public-Private Partnerships for Promotion of
Cross-Border Trade and Transportation, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 171, 174 (2012).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 172.
112. Public-Private Partnerships for Highway Projects: Testimony before the Panel
on Public-Private Partnerships H. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
113th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Joseph Kile, Assistant Director for
Microeconomic Studies (2014), http://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2014-03-
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that transfers more risk from the public sector to the private sec-
tor . . . .”113 To convey a general idea of the process, scholars at the
Brookings Institute provide nine recommendations for executing P3s:
(1) create a strong legal framework at the state level; (2) prioritize
projects based on quantifiable public goals; (3) pick politically smart
projects; (4) understand what the private sector needs; (5) find the
right revenue stream; (6) create a clear and transparent process; (7)
build an empowered team; (8) actively engage with stakeholders;
and (9) monitor and learn from the partnership.114
The “design-build-finance” approach to P3s is often pointed to as
one of three optimal model for highway projects.115 Under this ap-
proach, “the private partner provides the necessary up-front capital
and is generally repaid through tolls or by a state or local government
in a series of installments.”116
With increases in North American trade interdependency and a dis-
parity in public capital, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of devel-
oping cross-border infrastructure without some type of sustainable
economic model.117 Fortunately, P3s present a sustainable model to
couple private capital with government entities for improving crucial
border infrastructure and increasing trade.118
A. Benefits of the Public-Private Partnership
Like all major undertakings of this nature, the parties entering into
a P3 must have a thorough understanding of the complexities and
risks inherent in the process. However, if executed properly, P3s cre-
ate major benefits for both public and private sectors—generating a
shared revenue stream over time.119 Collaboration between the public
and private sectors means harnessing not only private-sector capital,
but also private-sector expertise, including access to technologies,
materials, and management techniques that might exceed the capabili-
ties of government agencies.120 This advantage can lead to increased
operational efficiency for projects, enhanced building methods, and
faster completion of projects.121
05-kile.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2U6-5E56] [hereinafter Public-Private Partnerships for
Highway Projects].
113. Id.
114. PATRICK SABOL & ROBERT PUENTES, PRIVATE CAPITAL, PUBLIC GOOD:
DRIVERS OF SUCCESSFUL INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 3
(Brookings Metropolitan Infrastructure Initiative, Dec. 2014), https://www.brook
ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/BMPP_PrivateCapitalPublicGood.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D8C9-M6YW].
115. Public-Private Partnerships for Highway Projects, supra note 112, at 3. R
116. Id.
117. See Lick & Hamlin, supra note 109, at 178–79. R
118. Id. at 179.
119. Id.
120. SABOL & PUENTES, supra note 114, at 10. R
121. Id.
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Moreover, though P3s do not present the most inexpensive method
of developing infrastructure,122 they can create better value for the
public dollar in numerous ways:
Driven by the need to deliver profit to investors and shareholders,
the private sector is less tolerant of cost overruns and project delays
than the public sector. Therefore, transferring construction, opera-
tional, and/or demand risk to the private sector can result in quanti-
fiable savings for the public sector, as taxpayers or ratepayers do
not bear the costs if the project takes longer than expected to com-
plete, goes over budget, or underperforms. . . . These might not be
the cheapest options in the short term, but have the potential to
drive savings over the long term through decreased energy usage,
lower maintenance costs, or enhanced resiliency.123
Through P3s, infrastructure projects can be developed or improved
without ceding public ownership.124 Thus, the government entity can
maintain oversight of the asset to ensure proper use while also having
the opportunity to reevaluate its role in maintaining ownership at the
termination of the P3 agreement.125 An ancillary benefit of P3s is job
creation.126 For instance, the NITC alone, which will cost about $3.6
billion, is estimated to create about ten thousand jobs.127 As a conse-
quence, P3s have also drawn the support of labor unions.128
In contrast to all of the excitement about P3s, some argue that infra-
structure should be completely privatized primarily for reasons of fi-
nancing, since a lack of federal funding is often the road block that
impedes public infrastructure projects.129 Other critics caution that
governments face risks when entering into contractual agreements
with private-sector entities, which can lead to more costs than antici-
pated because government entities are locked into long-term deals
with the potential for eventual disputes over control.130 Critics also
122. Id. at 11 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFF., USING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS




124. Id. at 12.
125. Id.
126. See Christopher H. Lee & Sean A. Medcalf, Case for Private-Public Partner-
ships, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2013, 4:49 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/the-
case-for-private-public-partnerships-089196#ixzz424OzgdCS [https://perma.cc/TS7D-
QK28].
127. Lick & Hamlin, supra note 109, at 181. R
128. Id. at 199 (citing WILLIAM REINHARDT, TRANSP. DEV. FOUND., THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE INVESTMENT INIn MEETING U.S. TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
NEEDS 34–35 (May 2011)).
129. See Chris Edwards, Infrastructure Investment, DOWNSIZING FED. GOV’T (Aug.
1, 2013), http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/infrastructure-investment [https://per
ma.cc/KX8K-HRGA].
130. Ryan Holeywell, Public. Private. Practical?, GOVERNING, Nov. 2013, at 34, 40
(available at http://www.governing.com/mag/november-2013-table-of-contents.html).
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point to a scarcity of data on P3s, questioning the belief that they actu-
ally generate profit. But others still concede that even if “[t]hey don’t
produce funding . . . they can reduce costs significantly.”131
In order to dispel some of these concerns and streamline the pro-
cess of P3s to derive the most benefits, experts with the Brookings-
Rockefeller Project on State and Metropolitan Innovation suggest
that the United States develop a separate “P3 unit” for quality con-
trol, policy formulation, and technical advice.132 In their report, the
authors evaluate P3s (referred to in the report as PPPs) on a larger
scale, but also look specifically at P3s in transportation and infrastruc-
ture projects noting that a “[P3] unit may act as a consolidator of in-
formation and policy regarding [P3s], overcoming the traditional
siloed structure of government agencies.”133 Similarly, a policy memo-
randum for the Council on Foreign Relations describes the use of P3s
to solve the problem of deteriorating infrastructure.134 The author
points out that there is a general lack of knowledge among local offi-
cials on how to form P3s.135 Therefore, to overcome this obstacle, the
author suggests the adoption of a national infrastructure unit to in-
crease knowledge among state and local officials about P3s.136 This
unit should be closely tied to the treasury so it can advise on evaluat-
ing risk, financial structuring, and public debt management.137
Examples of P3s around the world show that the proper execution
of private investment in public infrastructure can have positive results
for governments, investors, and ordinary citizens.138
B. Public-Private Partnerships at International Border Crossings
A critical part of implementing P3s, especially when they cross in-
ternational borders, is developing the proper legal framework.139 Gov-
ernments can only enter into P3s—which are, by nature, contractual
agreements—if there exists proper authorization from their jurisdic-
tion.140 Such authorizing legislation must grant authority to the gov-
ernment entity “to enter into concession and partnership contracts
131. Id. at 39.
132. EMILIA ISTRATE & ROBERT PUENTES, BROOKINGS-ROCKEFELLER, MOVING
FORWARD ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 1 (Dec. 2011), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1208_transportation_istrate_puentes.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JN35-TGFZ].
133. Id. at 7.
134. Heidi Crebo-Rediker, Infrastructure Finance in America—How We Get
Smarter 1–3 (Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 44,
Mar. 2014) (available at http://www.cfr.org/united-states/infrastructure-finance-
america-we-get-smarter/p32597).
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 2–3.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Id.
139. See SABOL & PUENTES, supra note 114, at 13. R
140. Id.
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with private entities without a second review by the legislature.”141
Additionally, the authorizing legislation should provide enough flexi-
bility for government entities to utilize P3s for a broad range of pro-
ject types, and must address fundamental P3 contractual issues like
allowing for the mixing of public and private funds.142
The agreement entered into by Canada and Michigan authorizing
the use of a P3 to construct the NITC was one of the largest cross-
border agreements involving a P3 to date.143 Interestingly, in the case
of the NITC, the Michigan legislature failed to pass P3-enabling legis-
lation to allow for the agreement between Michigan and Canada.144
Rather, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder entered into the agreement
with Canada under the authority of Michigan’s Urban Cooperation
Act of 1967, which allows interlocal agreements whereby two or more
governmental units enter into deals together for shared services like
infrastructure.145 The Crossing Agreement, executed by the Queen of
Canada,146 the Canadian Crossing Authority, and the State of Michi-
gan through Governor Snyder, provides the authority for Canada to
establish a Crossing Authority that will “design, construct, finance, op-
erate and maintain a new International Crossing between Canada and
Michigan, under the oversight of a jointly established International
Authority . . . with funding approved by Canada, but with no funding
by the Michigan Parties.”147 As the agreement states, Canada has
agreed to front all of the costs of the NITC.148
The need for sweeping infrastructure improvements at the U.S.-Ca-
nada and U.S.-Mexico borders is no secret to the government and has
resulted in several cooperative measures to address the issue. In 2000,
the U.S. Department of Transportation and Transport Canada entered
into a Memorandum of Cooperation.149 In order to develop standard
P3 model contracts for the development of transportation facilities,
President Obama signed into law the House Transportation and Infra-
structure Bill in 2012.150 Additionally, in December 2015 the Fixing
America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act was passed; Section
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Lick & Hamlin, supra note 109, at 180. R
144. Bill Shea, Snyder Set to Bypass Legislature on Bridge, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS.
(June 3, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20120603/FREE/
306039917/snyder-set-to-bypass-legislature-on-bridge [https://perma.cc/F72E-
QQUH]; see also About Us, PPP CANADA, http://www.p3canada.ca/about-us/ 114 R
(Canada created a federal public-private partnership unit as a corporation of the
Crown in 2009).
145. Shea, supra note 144; see also Crossing Agreement, supra note 1. R
146. The Queen of Canada, Elizabeth II, is a constitutional monarch who acts on
the advice of Canadian Government ministers.
147. Crossing Agreement, supra note 1. R
148. Id.
149. Lick & Hamlin, supra note 109, at 182. R
150. Id. at 183 (citing Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-141 (2012)).
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1437 of the FAST Act specifically provides additional funding for
states bordering Canada and Mexico to develop highway infrastruc-
ture supporting the cross-border movement of goods.151 And as re-
cently as July 2016, the United States Senate Committee on
Homeland Security reported favorably on P3-enabling legislation
sponsored by Texas Senator John Cornyn. The bill, titled the Cross
Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2016, would expand the authority
of United States Customs and Border Patrol to enter into P3s with
state and local governments in order to increase staffing and improve
infrastructure at existing ports of entry.152
In comparison with the rest of the world, the U.S. is new to the P3
process. Though as of 2011, thirty-three states had P3-enabling legisla-
tion for highways, roads, and bridges.153 In contrast, P3s are already
being utilized to fund cross-border infrastructure development across
the world. On an international scale, at least thirty-one countries have
institutions for the promotion, development, and management of
P3s.154 Experiences in the European Union (“EU”) indicate that the
legal framework for P3s must be conducive to private involvement.155
However, even in the EU, some member states have encountered
problems in the regulatory sphere. Regulatory uncertainty and unpre-
dictability will keep the private sector from investing; thus, examples
in the EU show that legislative and regulatory provisions need to be
well developed to accommodate P3s.156
C. Public-Private Partnerships for Future U.S.-Mexico Cross-
Border Infrastructure Projects
Developing freight trends at the U.S.-Mexico border highlight the
increasing need for adequate border infrastructure to decrease wait
times for commercial truck traffic. Experts at the Texas A&M Trans-
portation Institute conducted a study at the U.S.-Mexico border iden-
tifying trends and variations in freight movement across the border.157
Despite declines in trade movement worldwide, the study found that
surface trade between the U.S. and Mexico between 1995 and 2012
151. FAST Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94; 129 Stat. 1312 (2015) (codified at 23 U.S.C.
§ 139).
152. S. REP. NO. 114-303 at 1–2 (2016).
153. SABOL & PUENTES, supra note 114, at 14. R
154. Lawrence Martin et al., Internationally Recommended Best Practices in Trans-
portation Financing Public-Private Partnerships (P3s), 2 CANADIAN CTR. SCI. &
EDUC. 15, 17 (2013), (available at http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/par/article
/viewFile/30857/18165).
155. Willem van der Geest & Jorge Nunez-Ferrer, Appropriate Financial Instru-
ments for Public-Private Partnership to Boost Cross-Border Infrastructural Develop-
ment-EU Experience 16 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper 281, 2011).
156. Id.
157. Tracking Freight Traffic Trends at the U.S.-Mexico Border, TEX. A&M
TRANSP. INST., http://tti.tamu.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Tracking_Frieght_
Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4KS-LQUK].
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increased from $100 billion to $400 billion annually.158 The study also
noted that products moving across the border by truck have “an ag-
gregate freight value four to five times higher than products carried by
rail, though both modes increased steadily over time (economic down-
turns notwithstanding).”159
Poor infrastructure at the U.S.-Mexico border creates physical bar-
riers that delay transit times and thwart economic competitiveness.
Experts at the Council on Foreign Relations contend that “chronic
underinvestment in border infrastructure has slowed the movement of
goods and trade” as the volume of goods crossing the border only
continues to increase.160 They also note that, on average, U.S. ports of
entry are forty years old, though some have existed for nearly seventy
years.161 One of the consequences of underinvestment in border infra-
structure is border transit delay; on the current trajectory, wait times
at some of the largest ports of entry could reach eleven hours by 2035,
resulting in millions of dollars in economic losses.162 These types of
delays result in costs not only to the businesses shipping the goods, but
also to consumers, and even border cities.163 The Council states that
the border should not be a “chokepoint” that leaves trucks queuing
for hours; consequently, they recommend investment in border infra-
structure through innovative financing mechanisms like P3s.164
In a study of potential Arizona-Mexico P3s for border infrastruc-
ture, the U.S.-Mexico Joint Working Committee on Transportation ex-
plored the use of P3s to fund the expansion of infrastructure for the
movement of people and freight across the Arizona-Mexico border.165
The study identified several points of entry where there are large
amounts of vehicular and even pedestrian traffic, and it concluded by
identifying several projects that may be candidates for the use of a
design-build-finance P3s.166 The study revealed that there is minimal
overall use of P3 initiatives at border crossings around the country;
though, many states are pursuing these initiatives through greater pri-
vate-sector involvement with a key example in Texas at the Rio
Grande River crossing.167 Ultimately, the study identified sixteen
projects along the U.S.-Mexico border for consideration of potential
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 105, at 38. R
161. Id.
162. Id. at 70.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 70–71.
165. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.-U. S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNER-





167. Id. at 15, 20.
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P3s.168 Thus, this Comment argues that states along the U.S.-Mexico
border should, like Michigan, look to P3 enabling agreements with
Mexico to develop crucial infrastructure at the border to promote
trade.
Understanding the significant role it plays in North American trade,
Mexico already has well-developed laws on P3s in its “Ley de Asocia-
ciones Públicas Privadas.”169 These laws call for the construction of
infrastructure to improve social welfare and investment in Mexico,
creating a framework for P3s in Mexico to increase cooperation be-
tween the Mexican government and the private sector.170 Further-
more, this legislation allows the private sector to submit its own
proposals to relevant government agencies and allows the government
to enter into contracts with private parties.171 This Mexican legislation
acts as a compliment to its National Infrastructure Program (NIP),
aimed at improving Mexican infrastructure in order to bring Mexico
to the top twenty percent of the World Economic Forum’s Infrastruc-
ture Competitiveness Index by 2030.172 The logical conclusion of this
strategic move by Mexico is that it, too, believes that increased border
infrastructure leads to increased competitiveness in the global market.
Additionally, for the first time, Mexico’s development bank has
made a loan to a U.S.-based developer to provide funding for a
groundbreaking cross-border airport terminal; it will be the first time
the bank has made such a loan for a U.S.-based project to be primarily
collateralized by U.S. assets.173 This cross-border pedestrian bridge
links San Diego with the Tijuana A.L. Rodriguez International Air-
port, allowing pedestrians to walk freely between the U.S. and
Mexico.174
Of course, doing business with another country always involves
some risk. If Matthew Moroun’s legal battle provides any lesson, it is
168. Id. at 102.
169. Reglamento de la Ley de Asociaciones Público Privadas [LAPP] [Regulation
of the Public Private Associations Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] [Offi-
cial Journal of the Federation] 05-11-2012 (Mex.), http://dof.gob.mx/nota_to_pdf.
php?fecha=05/11/2012&edicion=MAT.
170. Bram Hanono, Mexico Continues to Entice Private Investment in Infrastructure
with a New Public-Private Partnership Act, SHEPPARD MULLIN: LATIN AMERICAN




172. Programa Nacional de Infraestructura 2014-2018 [Mexico National Infrastruc-
ture Program 2014-2018] (Mex.), http://cdn.presidencia.gob.mx/pni/programa-nacion
al-de-infraestructura-2014-2018.pdf?v=1 [https://perma.cc/7RA8-UK74].
173. Groundbreaking Cross-Border Airport Terminal Linking Tijuana to San Diego
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that anyone engaging in business with a private entity across borders
will need to be aware of the complex issues of “international commer-
cial litigation and arbitration—often involving considerable time and
expense.”175 Every company should evaluate several factors prior to
doing business with another country including costs, how to get a
judgment, where the evidence is located, the possibility of dispute tak-
ing place in the other country, and whether a private party can sue a
sovereign in a U.S. court.176
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico have become major
gateways for North American trade as the three countries become
more interdependent in our global economy. Arguably, the privately
owned Ambassador Bridge linking Detroit, Michigan, to Ontario, Ca-
nada, is the most important border crossing in all of North America,
as it accommodates more than one quarter of all trade with Canada,
the U.S.’s number one trading partner. The Ambassador Bridge in its
current state is unlikely to support increasing trade volume into the
future, and ease of access is problematic on both the Mexican and
Canadian sides of the border. Accordingly, after years of studies, plan-
ning, permits, and approvals, the competing New International Trade
Crossing will be constructed two miles down river from the Ambassa-
dor Bridge.
DIBC, the owner and operator of the Ambassador Bridge, has en-
gaged in numerous legal battles to halt the NITC construction in an
attempt to ward off competition. DIBC’s largest case, filed against Ca-
nada, the U.S., and a number of U.S. government officials, was largely
unsuccessful. The outcome of the case has answered several questions
regarding DIBC’s right to private ownership of the bridge: namely,
that DIBC does not have an exclusive franchise right to own and op-
erate the Ambassador Bridge and permit approvals for the NITC did
not result in issues of uncompensated taking of private property from
DIBC. Additionally, the agreement between Michigan and Canada to
build the NITC, approved by U.S. officials, was not in violation of the
foreign-compact clause and the issuance of a presidential permit for
the NITC was a valid executive action.
In the wake of these rulings, construction of the NITC is expected
to begin soon, but not without the demolition of a large portion of
Detroit’s failing Delray neighborhood. Consequently, property own-
175. Neil Popovic & Alejandro Moreno, Sovereign Litigation in Latin America: Top
Five Issues To Think of When Doing Business with a Latin American Country, SHEP-
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ers in the Delray neighborhood are likely to receive compensation for
their losses through the process of eminent domain. But for many
Delray business owners, “just compensation” may not be enough to
fully reimburse them for their losses if they are unable to relocate
their businesses. This, it appears, is one of the unfortunate conse-
quences to be anticipated in future large-scale border infrastructure
projects.
The conflict with the Ambassador Bridge and NITC highlights a
struggle between the public and private sectors in infrastructure own-
ership. However, P3s, like the one being used to construct the NITC,
present a new model for the financing and ownership of international
border crossings that fosters collaboration between the public and pri-
vate sectors. P3s are especially attractive now because there is a mea-
surable disparity in border infrastructure that the federal government
alone cannot afford to finance. It is incumbent on not only the U.S.,
but also on North America jointly, to create agreements that improve
border infrastructure and promote the free movement of goods,
thereby increasing North America’s global trade competitiveness.
With construction of the NITC set to begin soon, the focus should
shift to the U.S.-Mexico border. States along the U.S.-Mexico border
should work to model agreements analogous to that entered into by
Michigan and Canada for the development of the NITC. P3s present a
sustainable model for improving border infrastructure to alleviate the
current bottlenecks that create costly delays at the U.S.-Mexico
border.
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